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Abstract
We analyze lifecycle saving strategies using a recursive utility model
calibrated to match empirical estimates for the value of a statistical life. We
show that, with a positive value of life, risk aversion reduces savings and
annuity purchase. Risk averse agents are willing to make an early death a
not-so-adverse outcome by enjoying greater consumption when young and
bequeathing wealth in case of death. We also find that greater risk aversion
lowers stock market participation. We show that this model can rationalize
low annuity demand while also matching empirically documented levels of
wealth and private investments in stocks. Our findings stand in contrast to
studies that implicitly assume a negative value of life.
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Introduction

Household finance and the economic appraisal of the value of life are central issues
in the economics of aging. Although both topics make use of similar theoretical
foundations based on micro-economic lifecycle models, they have been studied in
separate strands of the literature with limited exchange between strands.
On the one hand, the literature on “household finance” (hereafter HF) tackles
questions related to consumption, saving and financial portfolio choices over the
lifecycle. These questions are of first-order importance for analyzing and designing
efficient pension systems, and for thinking more generally about saving incentives.
Mortality is usually taken into account, but since it is considered to be exogenous,
there tends to be no consideration of the willingness to pay for mortality risk
reduction.
On the other hand, the literature on the value of life (hereafter VoL) is centered
around questions related to endogenous mortality risk reduction, though has paid
limited attention to saving behaviors or portfolio choices. This literature has
aimed at providing insights into the trade-off that people face between wealth
and mortality, which is key to the evaluation of public policies aiming at lowering
mortality risk – such as road safety investments or public health spending.
Both literatures were initiated with contributions relying on the same decision
model: the standard additive expected utility model, as introduced by Yaari (1965)
in the HF literature and used by Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) and Rosen (1988)
in the VoL literature. There was therefore a single model of rational behavior that
could be used to discuss both kinds of issues. This additive model was criticized for
several reasons, however. The HF literature focused on the drawback of having risk
aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) intertwined, making
it impossible to consider agents with both a low IES and a high degree of risk
aversion. The VoL literature further criticized the additive model for suggesting
that agents unavoidably prefer death to life when their consumption gets small
enough when the IES is below one (see e.g., Marshall, 1984 or Rosen, 1988).
Both lines of literature tried to circumvent these difficulties by adopting recursive
specifications inspired by the framework of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990)
2

– which are usually referred to as EZW preferences. However, both branches of
the literature suggested the radically different and mutually incompatible choices
regarding preference parameters. On the one hand, papers in the HF literature
typically assume a coefficient of risk aversion above one. This, however, yields
EZW specifications that are inadequate for VoL matters, since they suggest that
people would prefer to have shorter lives (see our discussion in Section 2.3). On
the other hand, recent contributions in the VoL literature tackled the issues that
appear when using the additive model with a low elasticity of substitution by
assuming a degree of risk aversion below one (Hugonnier et al., 2013 and Córdoba
and Ripoll, 2017). However, EZW specifications that assume both the elasticity
of substitution and the coefficient risk aversion to be below one turn out to be
ill-defined when applied to situations with realistic mortality patterns and yield
counterfactual predictions for lifecycle behaviors unless some implausible “patches”
are added to correct for anomalies of the model. See Section 2.3 or Bommier et al.
(2018) for an extensive discussion.
Considered together, these recent developments in the HF and VoL literature
represent a fragmented approach where a given form of rationality is used when
dealing with some issues and another one, incompatible with the former, is used
for other issues. There is a need, therefore, for a consistent framework that can be
used for jointly modelling savings and mortality choices.
In the current paper, we introduce a well-behaved recursive framework that
can be used in both lines of literature, without suffering any of the drawbacks
mentioned above. In particular, our model makes it possible to disentangle the IES
and risk aversion, allowing for a high degree of risk aversion and a low IES, while
predicting plausible (and positive) levels for the value of mortality risk reduction
and realistic lifecycle profiles of consumption, savings, portfolio choice and annuity
demand.
Central to our approach is that we restrict our attention to models which
are monotone with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. The property of
monotonicity is essential as it rules out the choice of dominated strategies, which,
notwithstanding the fact that they are dominated, can represent optimal strategies
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in EZW models. In Section 2.4, we provide two examples of this – one in a setting
where an individual is deciding how much to invest in some risk-reducing factor
(e.g., health) and one in which an individual is deciding how much to save. As
shown in Bommier et al. (2017), imposing preference monotonicity leads to a focus
on risk-sensitive preferences, initially introduced by Hansen and Sargent (1995),
which we will use in the current paper.
The main finding of the paper is that once we constrain the value of mortality
risk reduction to be positive and preferences to be monotone, risk aversion is
found to reduce saving, annuity demand and stock purchases. These results stand
in contrast with those derived in previous studies based on recursive preferences
featuring a negative value of mortality risk reduction. Our model can further
explain why people purchase very few annuities (the so-called ‘annuity puzzle’; see
e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999) while matching empirically documented levels of wealth
accumulation and participation in stock markets.
The paper has three parts. In the first one, we provide a theoretical review
of recursive preferences, including additive, EZW and risk-sensitive preferences.
We highlight, in particular, the meaning of preference monotonicity. In the second
part, we work with a simple two-period model to emphasize why it is important to
properly calibrate the value of life for exploring the role of risk aversion. The last
part of the paper is a quantitative exercise that emphasizes the insights that can
be gained by using monotone preferences that feature a plausible value of life. We
discuss the predictions obtained with a rich calibrated model in which agents with
risk-sensitive preferences face different risks (mortality, income and asset return
risks), have bequest motives and have access to an annuity market.

2
2.1

Theory
The additive model

The most popular model in both the HF and the VoL literature is the time-additive
expected utility model. To link with the rest of the paper, we provide its recursive
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definition:
Ut = (1 − β)u(ct ) + βE[Ut+1 ],

(1)

where Ut is utility at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is a time preference parameter and u(ct )
is the instantaneous utility derived from consumption at time t.1 Accounting for
mortality is achieved by assigning a utility level, ud , obtained when death occurs.
As it is generally assumed that mortality risk is independent of other risks, the
expectation can be decomposed in two stages, one that accounts for the risk of
mortality and one that accounts for other risks. Formally denoting the utility
conditional on being alive at time t by Vt and the probability of surviving from
period t to t + 1 by πt the recursion (1) yields:
Vt = (1 − β)u(ct ) + β (πt E[Vt+1 ] + (1 − πt )ud ) .

(2)

Additive preferences, as defined in the above equation, are invariant when changing
u and ud (and Vt ) by the same positive affine transformation. It is therefore
possible to assume, without loss of generality, that the utility of death is set to
zero (ud = 0). If one assumes a constant IES, the function u has to be of the form
1−σ

u(c) = ul + K c1−σ for some constant ul (the subscript l stands for “life”) and a
positive scalar K. The IES is then given by σ1 . By (multiplicative) normalization,
the scalar K can be set equal to 1. It is not, however, possible to make a second
normalization and set ul to zero, since the zero utility level is already pinned
down as representing the utility of death. The parameter ul , which determines the
utility gap between life and death, is thus an important preference parameter. It is
noteworthy that when mortality is exogenous, the constant ul only contributes to
an exogenous additive term that has no impact on the ordering of consumption
profiles. This explains why the constant ul is generally ignored in all studies that
assume an exogenous mortality pattern but is explicitly mentioned in the VoL
literature (see, for example, the discussion in Hall and Jones, 2007).
The additive specification has been criticized on several grounds. Papers in the
HF literature – such as Gomes and Michaelides (2005), among others – expressed
concerns regarding the lack of flexibility of the additive specification, especially
1

The additive model is frequently defined using the recursion Ut = u(ct ) + βE[Ut+1 ], which is,
of course, equivalent to (1), up to a multiplicative renormalization of the function u.
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for its inability to disentangle the IES from risk aversion. The VoL literature, in
addition to this lack of flexibility, also emphasized the fact that when the IES is
smaller than one (i.e.,

1
σ

< 1), life becomes unavoidably worse than death when

consumption gets small enough. This creates an incentive to enter into Russianroulette games, so as to avoid having to live in a state which is worse than death.
As we discuss in Appendix A, this feature is actually not related to the additive
structure but to the assumption of a constant IES and could be avoided by assuming
that the IES gets higher when consumption tends to zero.

2.2

Recursive models with mortality

The search for greater flexibility led researchers contributing to each of the HF and
the VoL literatures to adopt non-additive recursive models for preferences. These
models assume that utility Ut at any date t is defined by the following recursion:
Ut = f −1 ((1 − β)u(ct ) + βφ−1 (E[φf (Ut+1 )]),

(3)

where φ is an increasing function representing risk preferences and f is a normalization device that can be any increasing function. As in the additive model
of Section 2.1, β ∈ (0, 1) is a time preference parameter and u(ct ) is the instantaneous utility function. The function f has no impact on preferences and its
role is to facilitate convenient representations of the recursion. A common choice
is f (x) = x, as in the additive specification (1), which we will also use for the
representation of risk-sensitive preferences in Section 2.5. Another common choice
for f , most often introduced in the case of EZW preferences – see Section 2.3 –
involves using the same CRRA function as that used for the instantaneous utility:
f (x) = u(x) =

x1−σ 2
.
1−σ

Recursive preferences defined by (3) may exhibit non trivial preference for the
timing of resolution of uncertainty. From Kreps and Porteus (1978), we know that
they exhibit preference for early resolution of uncertainty when, for any c > 0, the
2
Such a normalization implies that an infinitely long consumption path providing the same
consumption c in all periods yields a lifetime utility equal to c.
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function gc defined by:
x ∈ Im(φ) 7→ gc (x) = φ((1 − β)u(c) + βφ−1 (x))

(4)

is convex, and for late resolution if gc is concave. Moreover, as explained by Chew
and Epstein (1989), the degree of convexity of gc , which is measured by x 7→

gc00 (x)
,
gc0 (x)

quantifies the intensity of preference for the timing, that is, the more convex gc ,
the stronger the preference for early resolution.
Finally, as in the additive case, we can derive from equation (3) the recursion
defining the utility conditional on being alive at time t:




Vt = f −1 (1 − β)u(ct ) + βφ−1 (πt E[φf (Vt+1 )] + (1 − πt )φf (ud )) .

(5)

Here, again, ud denotes the utility level assigned to death and mortality risk is
assumed to be independent of other risks.

2.3

Homothetic EZW preferences

A popular recursive specification is that of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1990), which is obtained from equation (3), with u(c) = f (c) =
1
1−γ

((1 − σ)x)

1−γ
1−σ

c1−σ
,
1−σ

and φ(x) =

. This yields:


Ut = (1 −

β)ct1−σ

+β



1−γ
]
E[Ut+1

1
 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

(6)

.

When σ = γ, we obtain the additive model – up to the transformation by f . With
γ > σ, as is usually assumed in the HF literature, EZW exhibit preference for
early resolution of uncertainty. The magnitude of the implied timing premia are
discussed in Epstein et al. (2014).
The recursion relating the utilities conditional of being alive, shown in (5) is
now:


Vt = (1 −

β)c1−σ
t

+β



1−γ
πt E[Vt+1
]

+ (1 −

πt )u1−γ
d

1
 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

.

(7)

It is worth emphasizing that in specification (7), choosing a specific value for ud is
not a normalization choice, since changing ud would impact individual preferences.
The HF and VoL literatures then follow two different (and incompatible) routes.
7

In the HF literature, the standard assumption is to choose a coefficient of risk
aversion γ > 1. In order to get a homothetic specification, it is moreover assumed
that u1−γ
= 0 and thus, implicitly, that the utility of death is ud = +∞. The
d
recursion (7) reduces then to:


Vt = (1 −

β)c1−σ
t

1−σ
1−γ

+ βπt



1−γ
E[Vt+1
]

1
 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

,

(8)

as is the case, for example, in Gomes and Michaelides (2008). Clearly, setting ud =
+∞ involves assuming that death is preferable to life, regardless of consumption
levels. This has the consequence that utility is declining with survival probability
t
( ∂V
< 0).3 Since the HF literature focuses on cases where mortality is exogenous,
∂πt

one could think that this assumption is harmless. However, as we will see in Section
3, this is not the case, and this assumption drives some key results in the field.
Assuming that death is preferable to life precludes the use of the model to study
VoL issues. For this reason, rather than assuming γ > 1 and ud = +∞ , Hugonnier
et al. (2013) and Córdoba and Ripoll (2017) suggest the imposition of γ < 1 and
ud = 0, which again yields the recursion (8). An additional issue arises, however,
when considering the case where the IES is smaller than one ( σ1 < 1), which is
the relevant case in most of the literature (see the meta-analysis of Havránek,
2015). When applied to realistic mortality patterns, such models are typically
ill-defined, since the unique solution to the above recursion is the null function:
Vt = 0 independent of the consumption profile. Moreover, working with this model
without a consideration of definitional issues yields extremely odd predictions
where agents consume nothing early in the lifecycle to sustain a consumption that
sky-rockets towards +∞ at old ages. Such counterfactual implications are avoided
in Hugonnier et al. (2013) by assuming a model of perpetual youth, where mortality
risk remains small at all ages. In Córdoba and Ripoll (2017), the anomaly is
accommodated by the introduction of an ad hoc (exogenous) health profile, which
aims at decreasing the marginal utility of consumption in order to counterbalance
the effect mentioned above. However, for the correction to work, one has to assume

 1−σ
1−γ
1−γ
β
t
Equation (8) yields ∂V
=
E[V
]
Vtσ , which has the same sign as 1 − γ. See
t+1
∂πt
1−γ
Section 5 for further discussion.
3
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that greater health implies a lower utility level. The problem of a negative value of
life is solved by introducing another one: that of a negative value of health.4 We
refer to Bommier et al. (2018) and Zhang et al. (2018) for an extensive discussion
on these aspects.
Assuming a negative value of life, as in Gomes and Michaelides (2008) and in
many other papers in the HF literature, or using a framework that is ill-behaved
when the IES is smaller than one, as in Hugonnier et al. (2013) and Córdoba and
Ripoll (2017), will not be appropriate in many applications. There is therefore a need
to introduce another approach. Rather than bringing a new specification chosen
for its tractability, we suggest the imposition of a natural property: preference
monotonicity.

2.4

Preference monotonicity

An appealing property of preferences is monotonicity with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance (see Bommier and LeGrand, 2014a for a formal definition).
In words, monotonicity requires that an agent will not take an action if another one
would seem preferable in all future circumstances. This property, which is similar
to the elimination of dominated strategies in game theory, seems to be a reasonable
requirement when modeling individual rationality. The standard additive model is
monotone, but only few recursive extensions are monotone. Bommier et al. (2017)
show that EZW preferences are non-monotone, except when an IES equal to one is
assumed.5
The non-monotonicity feature of EZW preferences can be illustrated in various
4

Córdoba and Ripoll (2017) extend (8) by assuming that:

Vt =

(1 −

β)Ht c1−σ
t

1−σ
1−γ

+ βπt



1
 1−σ
 1−σ
1−γ

1−γ
E[Vt+1
]

,

where Ht is an exogenous health profile. By choosing an appropriate health profile, it is then
possible to match any possible consumption profile. The calibration in their paper leads to the
choice of a profile Ht that rapidly declines with age – so as to mechanically counterbalance the
counterfactual increase in consumption arising in that model when the IES is smaller than one.
When the IES is smaller than one (i.e., σ1 < 1), the model implies that health has a negative
∂Vt
< 0.
impact on welfare: ∂H
t
5
When the IES equals one (i.e., the limit case where σ → 1), EZW preferences enter in the
class of risk-sensitive preferences that we consider in Section 2.5.

9

settings. For example, Bommier et al. (2017) consider the case of saving behavior
with uncertain income and asset returns, in the absence of mortality risk. To get
closer to the problem considered by the current paper, we give below two examples
where EZW preferences yield dominated choices in settings where the uncertainty
is solely related to mortality.
First example: Investment in mortality risk reduction. In our first example, we consider an agent who may live for one or two periods. We assume
that consumption in the second period, in the case of survival, is exogenous and
equal to c1 . The only decision to be made by the agent is to dedicate an amount
e in the first period to some investment that reduces mortality risk (e.g., health
expenditures). We assume that such investments have a unit price. Letting w0
be the agent’s initial endowment of wealth, a mortality-risk reducing investment
equal to e leads to consumption in the first period of w0 − e.6 This choice impacts
the survival probability at the end of the first period. We further assume that
the survival probability also depends on another factor that the agent cannot
observe. More precisely, there are two possible states of nature h and s – that
can be thought of as “healthy” and “sick” – that occur with probability ph and
ps = 1 − ph , respectively. Investing e generates a survival probability πh (e) in state
h and survival probability πs (e) in state s. The agent has to select the level of
investment, e, without knowing the actual state of nature. A given effort level e∗ is
said to be dominated if another level ê would be preferable in both states h and s.
By definition, monotone preferences never yield dominated choices. This is not the
case for EZW preferences whenever γ 6= σ and σ =
6 1. With EZW preferences, the
agent’s problem can be written as:
1−σ



max (1 − β)(w0 − e)1−σ + β(1 − β)(E[π(e)]) 1−γ c1−σ
1
e≥0

6



1
1−σ

,

The wealth w0 aggregates all sources of agent’s revenues. Bequests received from parents, if
any, are supposed to be redistributed through a lump-sum transfer that is included in w0 . The
agent is therefore assumed not internalize possible bequest she may receive in her consumptionsaving decisions.
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where E[π(e)] = ph πh (e) + ps πs (e). If an interior optimum effort level e∗ > 0 exists,
it has to fulfill the following first-order condition:
(w0 − e∗ )−σ =

γ−σ
1
βE[π 0 (e∗ )] (E[π(e∗ )]) 1−γ c1−σ
.
1
1−γ

Two remarks can be made. First if γ > 1 an interior solution can be obtained
only if E[π 0 (e∗ )] < 0, meaning that investing further in precaution would reduce
life expectancy. This is in line with the fact that when γ > 1, the agent is willing
to reduce her survival probability (i.e., the value of mortality risk reduction is
negative) – see the discussion about

∂Vt
∂πt

< 0 in Section 2.3. The second point, which

relates to our discussion of monotonicity, is that whenever γ 6= σ and σ 6= 1, it is
possible to find functions πh (·) and πs (·) such that the optimal effort is obtained
for some e∗ > 0 while another optimal effort level eb 6= e∗ would be preferable in
both states h and s. The formal proof is given in Section B.2 of the Appendix.
Second example: A cake-eating problem. Our second example also considers
a two-period problem using EZW preferences. Here, we study the savings decision
of an agent who has an exogenous probability (π0 ∈ (0, 1)) of surviving to the
second period. Formally, we consider a simple “cake-eating” problem where the
agent endowed with an initial amount of wealth w0 , and no additional source of
revenue, has to decide in period 0 how much to keep for period 1. For simplicity,
we assume that the agent has to choose an amount b to be invested in a risk-free
bond whose return is equal to β1 . The decision problem is therefore:
1−σ

max (1 − β)(w0 − b)
b∈R+

1−σ
1−γ

+ βπ0

b
(1 − β)( )1−σ
β

!

1
1−σ

.

(9)

Ex ante, the agent foresees two possible states of the world. Either she lives only
one period, and optimal behavior would be to consume everything in that period
(zero savings: b = 0). Or she lives two periods and the optimal strategy involves
saving b =

w0
1+β

in order to have the same consumption level in both periods. The

agent however, has to make a saving decision before knowing which state realizes.
Choosing a saving level above
w0
1+β

w0
1+β

would be a dominated choice since saving exactly

would provide a higher ex-post utility whether she survives or not.
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Simple derivations show that the solution to (9) is b∗ =

w0

1 σ−1
σ 1−γ

. The interest-

1+βπ0

ing case is the one where the risk aversion is below 1 (γ < 1) and the IES is also
below 1 ( σ1 < 1). This implies that b∗ >

w0
,
1+β

indicating that the agent opts for a

dominated strategy. Even more surprising, when π0 becomes very small, then b∗
gets close to w0 . In other words, when the agent is almost sure of dying at the end
of the first period, she decides to consume almost nothing in the first period, to
keep all her resources for a second period that she will almost surely never see. The
non-monotonic feature of the agent’s behavior here is quite extreme and illustrates
the drawbacks of opting for non-monotone preferences.
Such drawbacks extend to multi-period settings, yielding similar conclusions
regarding saving behaviors. We refer again to Bommier et al. (2018) for a detailed
analysis.

2.5

Risk-sensitive preferences

Imposing monotonicity does not preclude the use of non-additive recursive models.
It does, however, dramatically reduce the set of recursive specifications that can
be used. It was shown in Bommier et al. (2017) that the only class of Kreps
and Porteus (1978) recursive preferences that is monotone and flexible enough
to disentangle risk aversion from the IES is the one provided by risk-sensitive
preferences. Such preferences correspond to the recursive setting where:
Ut = (1 − β)u(ct ) −



β
log Et [e−kUt+1 ] .
k

(10)

As was the case for EZW preferences, recursion (10) is a particular case of equation
(3), where f (x) = x, and φ(x) =

1−e−kx
.
k

When k → 0, recursion (10) converges

toward the standard additive model of Section 2.1.
Intuitively, preferences represented by recursion (10) are monotone, as the
term (1 − β)u(ct ) can be included inside the expectation. That is, recursion (10)
can also be written as Ut =

− βk



− βk ((1−β)u(ct )+βUt+1 )

log E[e



] , implying that the

choices at time t involve maximizing an expectation, just like in the expected utility
framework.
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With risk-sensitive preferences, the function gc defined in (4) takes the form:
gc (x) =

1 − (1 − kx)β e−k(1−β)u(c)
1
, for x ∈ Im(φ) = (−∞, ).
k
k

Simple calculation show that

gc00 (x)
gc0 (x)

=

k(1−β)
,
1−kx

which is independent of c. Risk-

sensitive preferences with k > 0, therefore exhibit a preference for early resolution
of uncertainty, the degree of which depends on both β and k.7 A feature that is worth
emphasizing is that preferences defined by (10) are invariant when adding a constant
to the instantaneous utility function u. Indeed, equation (10) directly implies that
for any λ ∈ R, we have Ut + λ = (1 − β)(u(ct ) + λ) −

β
k





log Et [e−k(Ut+1 +λ) ] .

Thus adding a constant λ to the instantaneous utility amounts to adding the
same constant λ to the utilities Ut , with no impact on agent’s preferences. The
risk-sensitive model thus preserves one of the invariance properties of the additive
specification.8 This is convenient for normalization matters, since just like in
the additive model, it can be assumed that ud = 0 with no generality loss. The
recursion (5), relating the utilities conditional on being alive then becomes:
Vt = (1 − β)u(ct ) −



β
log πt E[e−kVt+1 ] + 1 − πt .
k

Interestingly risk-sensitive preferences do not constrain the IES to be constant, so
that the simple solutions suggested in Appendix A could possibly be adopted to
avoid tastes for Russian-roulette lotteries.
Note also that risk-sensitive preferences could serve as a basis for extensions
that would combine recursivity, monotonicity and recent developments in decision
theory – in particular the models, building upon the recursive structure of Kreps
and Porteus (1978), which account for source-dependent risk aversion. See Skiadas
(2013, 2015), as well as Gârleanu and Panageas (2015, Appendix D).
7

This reflects a relationship between time preferences, risk aversion and preference for the
timing, which necessarily holds for monotone recursive preferences. See Bommier et al. (2017).
Note that when β gets close to one, preference for the timing vanishes.
8
The additive specification is also invariant to a (multiplicative) rescaling of the instantaneous
utility. Here, rescaling instantaneous utility without impacting preferences would require to
rescale the risk aversion parameter, k.
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3

Why does the value of life matter?

With monotone preferences, a utility maximizing choice under uncertainty can be
seen as making trade-offs between the ex-post utilities obtained in each state of
the world.9 Moreover, increasing risk aversion has the effect of putting greater
weight on “bad states” of the world when considering such trade-offs. In a number
of cases, this leads to intuitive predictions, as illustrated with a precautionary
saving problem in Bommier et al. (2017). Similarly, the two-period problem we
explore below shows that this ability to derive simple predictions also applies to
intertemporal choice under uncertain lifetime, with clear-cut predictions on saving
behaviors, bequests, and annuity purchase. Moreover, this example will emphasize
that in order to understand the role of risk aversion, it is essential to correctly
identify what are good states and bad states of the world. The predictions will be
completely different if one assumes that having a long life is a good outcome (i.e.,
if the value of mortality risk reduction is positive) or if one assumes that having a
long life is a bad outcome (i.e., if the value of mortality risk reduction is negative),
even if mortality is assumed to be exogenous.
We consider here an agent who lives for at most two periods. In period 0, the
agent is endowed with a level of wealth w0 and has to make saving and annuity
purchase decisions. More precisely, the agent may invest in bonds, which yield
a safe return of Rf and which are bequeathed in case of death, or in annuities,
with return

Rf
π0

but are not bequeathable. Formally, denoting by c0 and c1 the

consumption in the first and second periods, by b the amount invested in bonds,
by a the amount invested in annuities, and by x the amount bequeathed in case of
death, we have:
w0 = c0 + b + a; c = Rf (b +

a
); x = Rf b.
π0

The agent is endowed with risk-sensitive preferences, as represented by equation
(10). However, the utility associated with death is not constant and equal to ud
anymore, but depends on the size of the bequest left by the agent to her heirs.
9

This is not the case with non-monotone preferences, since the agent may take actions that
lower the ex-post utilities in all states.
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We denote by v(x) the utility associated with bequeathing the amount x. The
recursion (5) defining the utility V0 representing the agent’s preferences becomes,
in the presence of bequests:
V0 = (1 − β)u(c0 ) −



β
log π0 e−k(1−β)u(c1 ) + (1 − π0 )e−k(1−β)v(x) .
k

We further assume here that u(c) = ul +

c1−σ
1−σ

(11)

1−σ

and v(x) = ud + θ x1−σ , where the

scalar θ ≥ 0 quantifies the strength of the bequest motives. There is no consensus
on the formulation of v, but the form we have chosen is the same as in Cocco et al.
(2005), Inkmann et al. (2011) and Yogo (2016).10 With no loss of generality, we
can normalize the utility with ud = 0. Note that further constraining utility by
setting, for instance ul = 0 would not be a mere normalization and would impose
constraints on the value of mortality risk reduction. The larger ul , the greater
the utility gap between life and death and the larger the value of mortality risk
reduction. In particular, it follows from (11) that:
−k(1−β)(ul +

β
e
∂V0
=
−k(1−β)u(c
)
−k(1−β)v(x)
1
∂π0
π0 e
+(1 − π0 )e

implying that, for a given c1 and w, we have
(people then prefer longer lives) and

∂V0
∂π0

∂V0
∂π0

c1−σ
1
1−σ

− e−k(1−β)θ
−k
)

> 0 if ul is above

x1−σ
1−σ

, (12)
θx1−σ −c1−σ
1
1−σ

< 0 if ul is below that threshold (people

then prefer shorter lives).
Let bk and ak be the optimal saving and annuity choices of an agent with risk
aversion k. Formally, the consumption-saving program can be written as:
(bk , ak ) = arg max 2 (1 − β)u(w0 − b − a)

(13)

(b,a)∈R+

β
−k(1−β)u(Rf b+Rf πa )
−k(1−β)v(Rf b)
0 + (1 − π )e
− log π0 e
0
k




We denote by c0,k = w0 − bk − ak and c1,k = Rf (bk + aπk0 ) the corresponding optimal
first- and second-period consumption levels. Here again, the case of additively
separable preferences is obtained by taking the limit as k → 0.
10

Other papers, such as De Nardi (2004), Lockwood (2012) or Bommier and LeGrand (2014b)
1−σ
consider a bequest utility of the form θ (x+x)
that is not homothetic but enables bequests to
1−σ
be modeled as a luxury good. We will use such a specification in the calibrated multi-period
quantitative model presented in Section 4.
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Proposition 1 Consider the consumption-saving problem of equation (13).
If k = 0, then the choices a0 and b0 , and hence the consumption levels c0,0 and
c1,0 , are independent from ul .
If k > 0, we have:
– if ul such that

∂V0
∂π0

> 0 at the optimum (i.e., if the value of mortality risk

reduction is positive), then
– if ul such that

∂V0
∂π0

∂ak
∂k

< 0,

∂bk
∂k

> 0,

∂c0,k
∂k

> 0 and

∂c1,k
∂k

< 0;

< 0 at the optimum (i.e., if the value of mortality risk

reduction is negative), then

∂ak
∂k

> 0,

∂bk
∂k

< 0,

∂c0,k
∂k

< 0 and

∂c1,k
∂k

> 0.

The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Section B.1 of the Appendix. Here
we will comment on the results of Proposition 1, focusing on the case where k > 0.
We begin with the case where

∂V0
∂π0

> 0 at the optimum, that is, when the agent

would prefer to have a greater survival probability. We find that increasing risk
aversion increases first-period consumption (

∂c0,k
∂k

> 0), implying therefore that

∂
overall savings are reduced ( ∂k
(bk + ak ) < 0). Moreover, savings shift towards safe
k
k
> 0) at the expense of annuity purchases ( ∂a
< 0). In fact, the greater
assets ( ∂b
∂k
∂k

the risk aversion, the more the agent is concerned about the bad state, that is, the
case where she would die after the first period. To increase lifetime utility derived
in this bad state, she increases her first period consumption and the amount she
k
leaves as bequest ( ∂b
> 0). At the same time, she purchases a smaller amount of
∂k

annuities. These choices make a short life a less adverse outcome. Of course, this
comes at the cost of a lower second-period consumption (

∂c1,k
∂k

< 0) and of a lower

∂
lifetime utility in case of survival ( ∂k
(u(c0,k ) + βu(c1,k )) < 0).

Interestingly, the findings look very different in the counterfactual case where
∂V0
∂π0

< 0, that is, when the agent would prefer to have a lower survival probability.

Indeed, as shown in Proposition 1, the impact of an increase in risk aversion is
systematically reversed compared to the case where the value of mortality risk
reduction is positive. This is understandable since the impact of an increase in risk
aversion is to put greater focus on the bad state, and thus mechanically depends
on which state is actually the worst. When u(c1 ) < v(x), the bad state is the one
where the agent lives for two periods, and an agent with k > 0 purchases a larger
16

amount of annuities than an agent with additive preferences (k = 0), precisely to
make such a “bad outcome” not so bad. As we will see in Section 5, such matters
related to the sign of the value of life are key to understand how our results contrast
with those of previous contributions.
A final remark is that since preference for the timing and risk aversion are
intertwined for risk-sensitive preferences, one may be concerned that the results of
Proposition 1 are driven by preference for the early resolution of uncertainty and
not by risk aversion. The case β = 1 can help disentangle the two effects. First,
when β = 1, the RS model features indifference with respect to the timing of the
resolution of uncertainty (see Footnote 7 in Section 2.5). Second, it can be checked
that the results of Proposition 1 are still valid – with strict inequalities – when
β = 1.11 Together, these two facts show that the force driving Proposition 1 is risk
aversion and not preference for the timing.

4

A quantitative lifecycle model

Having argued why the value of life matters even in models with exogenous mortality
risk, this section outlines a quantitative lifecycle model which can be used to study
the interplay between that risk, saving behavior, portfolio choice and annuity
purchases. The model’s innovation is to use, in an otherwise standard lifecycle
model, risk-sensitive preferences to ensure preference recursivity and monotonicity
while matching empirical estimates of the value of mortality risk reduction. .

4.1

The setup

We consider an economy populated by agents endowed with risk-sensitive preferences
who face risks over mortality, income and asset returns. The agent may save through
a bond, a risky asset and may insure against longevity risk by purchasing an annuity.
11

In order to deal with the case β = 1, instantaneous utility has to be normalized differently (to
avoid the factor 1 − β which is then null and no longer a mere normalization – see also Footnote
1 in Section 2.1). With β = 1, the problem (13) should be written as:
(bk , ak ) = arg max 2 u(w0 − b − a) −
(b,a)∈R+



f
f a
f
1
log π0 e−ku(R b+R π0 ) + (1 − π0 )e−kv(R b) .
k
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Time is discrete, a model period is a year, and time t denotes model age, which is
biological age minus 20. The agent enters the model at the start of working life, at
t = 0. There is a single consumption good, whose price serves as a numeraire.
Mortality risk. The agent faces mortality risk, which is assumed to be exogenous
and independent of all other risks. If alive at date t, the agent survives to date
t + 1 with probability πt . There exists a date TM , such that the probability of
living after TM is πTM = 0.
Labor income risk. At any age, when alive, the agent receives an income
denoted yt . The agent exogenously retires at age TR . During retirement (t ≥ TR ),
the agent receives an annual pension income yt = y R . During working life (t < TR ),
the agent earns a risky labor income yt = ytL ,
ln ytL = µt + ζt ,
ζt = ρζt−1 + υt .

(14)
(15)

where (µt )t≥0 is a deterministic process that depends on age, and ζt is an AR(1)
stochastic component, with persistence parameter ρ and innovation (υt )t≥0 , which
is IID normally distributed with mean 0 and variance συ2 . We denote average
earnings over working life as ȳ.
Financial risk and security markets. The agent can save through bonds and
stocks and can purchase an annuity. The bond pays a constant risk-free gross
return, Rf . The stock yields a risky return, defined as: Rts = Rf + ω + νt , where ω
represents the average risk premium of stocks over bonds, while the financial risk
(νt )t≥0 is an IID normally distributed process with mean 0 and variance σν2 .
The agent must pay a cost F ≥ 0 to participate in the stock market, which
may be interpreted as the opportunity cost of discovering how the stock market
works. In our baseline model, we assume it is a flat once-in-a-lifetime cost: if the
cost is paid at a given date t, the agent can freely trade stocks at date t and at any
date afterwards.12
12

In Appendix F.3, we investigate another participation structure, where the cost must be paid
in every period the agent wants to buy stocks.
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Finally, an annuity can be purchased in the period before retirement age (TR −1).
The annuity is a financial asset that pays one unit of income every period, as long
as its holder is alive. The price of a single unit of annuity income, q, is:
q = (1 + δ)

TMX
−TR
τ =1

Qτ

πTR −1+s
,
(Rf )τ

s=0

(16)

where the parameter δ ≥ 0 is a loading factor on annuity. When δ = 0, the annuity
is actuarially fair and its price equals the discounted present value of future payoffs.
The larger δ, the further is annuity pricing from actuarial fairness. There is one
final annuity market imperfection. Following Pashchenko (2013), annuity purchases
below a minimum threshold (a > 0) are not allowed.
Timing and choices. At the start of every period, the agent first learns the
realizations of financial and labor income shocks and whether she is alive or not.
If she is alive, her resources at the beginning of the period consist of her wealth,
comprising bond, annuity and stock payoffs plus labor income earned, or public
pension income received, in the period. Resources are used to cover consumption
as well as the purchase of bonds, annuities, and stocks. Formally, the budget
constraint of the living agent at date t can then be expressed as follows:
ct + qat + bt + st + 1ηt =1 1ηt−1 =0 F = yt + wt ,
with: wt = aTR −1 1t≥TR + Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 ,

(17)
(18)

where ct and wt are consumption and wealth in period t and bt , st and at are,
respectively, the quantity of bonds, stocks and annuities purchased in period t.
The index ηt reflects market participation status and is equal to 0 if she has never
paid the participation cost before and therefore never held stocks. The term

1ηt =1 1ηt−1 =0 F in equation (17) represents the fixed cost of participation.13 Annuity
returns are received from age TR and are therefore equal to aTR −1 1t≥TR . No asset,
13

Throughout the paper, 1A denotes an indicator function equal to 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise.
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including annuities, can be sold short. These constraints are summarized here:
st = 0 if ηt = 0,

(19)

at = 0 if t 6= TR − 1,

(20)

aTR −1 = 0 or aTR −1 ≥ a,

(21)

bt ≥ 0, st ≥ 0 and ct > 0

(22)

If the agent is dead at date t, she bequeaths bonds and stocks, but not annuities.
The bequest xt amounts to:
xt = Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 .

(23)

A feasible allocation is a sequence of choices (ct , bt , at , st , xt , ηt )t≥0 satisfying the
constraints (17)–(23). The set of feasible allocations is denoted A. We assume
exogenous initial conditions: η−1 = 0, b−1 ≥ 0, a−1 ≥ 0, and s−1 ≥ 0.

4.2

Preferences and agent’s program

Intertemporal preferences. Agents have risk-sensitive preferences. The utility
of the alive agent at age t, Vt , is defined through the following recursion:
Vt = (1 − β)u(ct ) −


h
i
h
i
β
log πt Et e−kVt+1 + (1 − πt )Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ,
k

(24)

where v(xt ) is the instantaneous utility obtained upon dying and bequeathing xt .
Utility is normalized here so that being dead while leaving no bequest provides
utility v(0) = 0.14
Instantaneous utility function specification. We assume that the agent has
a constant IES. Formally,

u(c) =




u

+

c1−σ −1
1−σ

if σ 6= 1,



u

+ log(c)

if σ = 1,

l

l

14

(25)

With such a normalization the continuation utility when dead, (1 − β)v(xt+1 ) + βv(0),
simplifies to (1 − β)v(xt+1 ).
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where the parameter σ > 0 is the inverse of the IES, and ul is a parameter that
provides the instantaneous utility derived when alive and consuming one unit of
consumption (u(1) = ul ). It can also be interpreted as the difference in utility
between being alive and consuming one unit and being dead and bequeathing
nothing (ul = u(1) − v(0)). Since utility has already been normalized when
assuming v(0) = 0, we cannot further set ul to an arbitrary value. This parameter
must, therefore, be carefully calibrated. Note that when σ > 1, there necessarily
exists a threshold c below which u(c) < 0, implying that the agent would prefer
to die and leave no bequest rather than staying alive. In theory, this threshold
could be used to calibrate ul . However, this would involve basing the calibration on
extreme cases (suicides), for which our model is surely ill-suited (a suicidal decision
is a complex multi-dimensional decision that, needless to say, involves more than
poverty). A better calibration strategy, which we will use in Section 4.4, relies on
using agents’ decisions that relate to safety. Since a higher value of ul means a
higher valuation of being alive relative to being dead, the value of ul should be
reflected in the financial decisions that agents make to lower their mortality risks,
for example when investing in safer (but more expensive) cars or opting for safer
(but lower paid) jobs.
The utility derived from bequests, v(x), is assumed to be continuous, increasing
in the amount of bequest, and to exhibit bounded and decreasing marginal utility.
The functional form we use has been widely applied (see e.g., De Nardi, 2004,
De Nardi et al., 2010, Ameriks et al., 2011, and Lockwood, 2012 and 2018). Formally,

v(x) =


h


 θ (x + x)1−σ
1−σ





θ log x+x



− x1−σ

i

if σ 6= 1,
(26)
if σ = 1,

x

where σ is the inverse of the IES used in the expression (25) defining the function
u, while θ ≥ 0 is the strength of the bequest motive. With x > 0, bequests are
a luxury good, as has been shown by, for example, Hurd and Smith (2002). The
derivative v 0 (0) is finite, so that agents bequeath only when their wealth is large
enough (an empirical regularity documented by e.g., De Nardi, 2004).
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Agent’s program. The agent’s problem involves determining the feasible allocation in the set A that maximizes her utility defined in (24). There is no analytical
solution to this problem. We thus solve the model numerically. In short, state
variables are discretized and decision rules are obtained for points on the grid
by backwards induction from the last period. Linear approximation is used to
evaluate the value function at points off the grid and integration over earnings and
asset price shocks is carried out using Tauchen (1986). Further details are given in
Appendix D.

4.3

Value of mortality risk reduction

To properly calibrate ul , we will consider the marginal rate of substitution between
survival probability and wealth, which quantifies how much a given agent is willing
to pay – in terms of wealth – to reduce her mortality risk. This marginal rate of
substitution is most often called the value of a statistical life (VSL, henceforth),
even though there are recent recommendations to use the terminology “value of
mortality risk reduction”.15 Formally, the VSL at date t, denoted V SLt , is defined
as:
V SLt =

∂Vt
∂πt
∂Vt
∂wt

,

(27)

where we recall that expression of the wealth wt is provided in equation (18).
This definition is standard and is used in Rosen (1988), for instance. The formal
expressions for the risk-sensitive and additive models – that will be used to calibrate
ul – can be found in Section B.3 of the Appendix.
Empirical literature on the value of a statistical life. The value of mortality
risk reduction is a central parameter for cost-benefit analyses in many policy
realms. This includes evaluating environmental policy (see U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 2011 where the value of mortality risk reduction is central in
estimating the benefits of the Clean Air Act), transport policy (see US Department
of Transportation, 2016 on quantifying the benefit of road safety rules) and decisions
around the availability of medical procedures in countries where the choice of which
15

See https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/mortality-risk-valuation for a
discussion.
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(expensive) medical treatments to offer is made by the state (see Rawlins and
Culyer, 2004 for a discussion in the context of the UK’s National Health Service).
There are two distinct approaches that have been used to estimate the value of
mortality risk reduction. The first is a revealed preference approach which estimates
it from observed decisions by individuals (e.g., from compensating differentials
associated with risky jobs or willingness to pay for safety features on vehicle
purchases). The second is a stated preference approach, where individuals’ valuation
is explicitly elicited by a survey. Both approaches provide a relatively broad range of
estimates. This is not surprising, as any estimate of willingness-to-pay for mortality
risk reduction will depend on individual preferences and individual financial and
demographic characteristics. A broad overview of the literature and details on the
range of estimates that have been reported can be found in Viscusi and Aldy (2003)
and Kniesner and Viscusi (2019).

4.4

Calibration

Demographics, endowments and asset market parameters. We describe
here how exogenous parameters, relating to demographics, endowments and asset
markets, are set. Table 1 provides a summary.
Taking demographics first, agents retire at the age of 65, which for many years
was the Normal Retirement Age for Social Security in the U.S. Mortality rates are
taken from the Human Mortality Database for the USA for 2016. We assume that
all individuals die at the age of 100 if not before.
Turning to endowments, agents earn a wage in each period up to the age
of 64 and receive Social Security payments from the age of 65. The shape of
the deterministic age-productivity profile is taken from Harenberg and Ludwig
(2019), who compute it from PSID data using the method in Huggett et al. (2011).
This series is transformed so that average earnings are set at $46,640, average
US net earnings in 2016 (Social Security Administration, 2020). The values for
the stochastic component of the income process are taken from Guvenen (2009),
who reports an autocorrelation ρ = 0.988 and a variance of persistent shocks of
συ2 = 0.015. Further details on the earnings process are given in Appendix E. Public
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Table 1: Exogenous parameters in baseline economy
Parameter

Value

Source

Age at retirement, TR

45

(= 65 − 20)

SSA Historical Normal Retirement Age in US

Maximum age, TM

80

(= 100 − 20)

Demographics

Cond. survival rates, {πt }

Human Mortality Database,
U.S. 2016

Endowments
Average wage, ȳ

US$ 46,640

Average net compensation
2016, SSA

Age productivity, {µt }

cf. App. E

Harenberg
(2019)

Public pension, y R

40%×ȳ

Average SS replacement
rate (Biggs and Springstead,
2008)

Labor income autocorr., ρ

0.988

Guvenen (2009)

Var. of persistent shocks, συ2

0.015

Guvenen (2009)

Gross risk-free return, Rf

1.02

Campbell and Viceira (2002)

Equity premium, ω

4%

Campbell and Viceira (2002)

Stock volatility, σν

15.7%

Campbell and Viceira (2002)

Min. annuity purchase, a

US$ 3,680

Pashchenko (2013)

Administrative load, δ

10%

Pashchenko (2013)

and

Ludwig

Asset Markets

Annuity Market

pensions, y R , are set at 40 percent of the average earnings, which is approximately
the average replacement rate afforded by Social Security (Biggs and Springstead,
2008). We assume that the agent enters the model with no assets, s−1 = 0 and
b−1 = 0.
Turning finally to our parameterization of asset market features, we follow
Campbell and Viceira (2002). The gross risk-free return is set at Rf = 1.02. We
set the equity premium to ω = 4% and stock volatility is σν = 15.7%. These values
represent common choices in the lifecycle literature (see, for example, Lusardi et al.,
2017). We set the administrative load (δ) to 10% (the value used by Pashchenko,
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2013, Lockwood, 2012, and in range of Brown, 2007). We set the minimum annuity
purchase to $3,680, calculated by converting the value in Pashchenko (2013) to
2016 dollars. The final feature of the asset market, F , the participation cost in
the risky asset, is calibrated to match participation in stock markets – we defer
discussion of that to below.
Preference parameters. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to
0.5, so that its inverse is σ = 2, which is a common value in the literature. The
time preference and risk aversion parameters, β and k, and the utility gap between
life and death, ul , are set so that lifecycle behaviors match our calibration targets,
as we will detail later on.
To set the bequest function parameters (θ, which governs the intensity of the
bequest motive, and x̄, which governs the extent to which bequests are a luxury
good), we use the estimates of De Nardi et al. (2010), who study the problem
of bequests in detail. Their model, which features additive preferences, implies
different values for IES and the discount factor to ours, and we therefore cannot
directly import their bequest parameters. Our approach is to replicate two targets
implied by their model: (i) the maximal wealth with zero bequest; (ii) the marginal
propensity toconsume wealth, both of which are computed for an alive agent at
the maximal age – such that she dies for sure in the next period – who can only
save in the riskless asset. This removes any risk in the model and the risk-sensitive
model reduces to the additive one. The parameters of De Nardi et al. (2010) imply
a value of $36,000 (in 1998 dollars) for the maximal no-bequest wealth and of 0.88
for the marginal propensity to bequeath wealth in the last period of life.16 To
match these parameters, we set x̄ = 8.50 and θ = 56.55.17 See Appendix C for the
formal expressions of the quantities we match and further details on the calculation
of these numbers.
16

These numbers are implied by the estimates in column 3 of Table 3 of their paper. See the
discussion in Appendix D of their paper.
17
x̄ is expressed in units of average income, which is the unit used in solving the model. The
dollar equivalent is $396,477.
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Calibration of remaining parameters to match lifecycle behavior. Four
parameters are calibrated to match features of behavior over the lifecycle: the
utility gap between life and death (ul ), the discount factor (β), the parameter
governing risk aversion (k), and the cost of fully participating in financial markets
(F ). We calibrate them by matching four targets: the VSL at age 45, asset holdings
at age 65, annuity holdings at 65 and the proportion of people at 65 who hold risky
assets.18
For the VSL at age 45, we target a value of $10m, which is suggested as a central
estimate for the US by the recent review article by Kniesner and Viscusi (2019).
This is close to the value of $9.6m used by the US Department of Transportation
(2016) and in the range of $8.8m–$10.6m, used by the Environmental Protection
Agency (2011) in evaluating the Clean Air Act.
To obtain a target to match mean modeled wealth at the age of 65, we use
the 2016 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances. We select a sample of single
individuals without children. There are only approximately 100 such individuals
at each age – and so to increase the sample size we calculate the mean for those
between 60 and 69. We winsorize at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This yields a
mean of $366,000. We also show in Appendix F.2 the robustness of our results to
matching simulated wealth at 45 to a sample defined similarly to above of those
between 40 and 49 (the mean for this group is $169,000).
We target the proportion of households holding annuities. This proportion in
the U.S. is extremely low (this fact is, of course, the source of the annuity ‘puzzle’).
Lockwood (2012) reports that 3.6% of single retirees hold annuities; Pashchenko
(2013) reports 5%, also for a sample of single retirees. We target the latter, slightly
higher, number.
Finally, participation cost is calibrated (jointly with the preference parameters)
to deliver a stock market participation rate of 50% at age 65, which is in the range
reported by Alan (2006).
In our results, we will compare our simulated profiles to an additive model
that will also be calibrated to meet these targets. As the risk aversion parameter
18

For the value of life we choose its estimated value at age 45 (and not 65) as a calibration
target, as most empirical studies rely on wage-risk trade-offs, estimated on samples of workers.
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k is constrained to equal zero in the additive specification, matching the targets
requires us to add one degree of freedom. To do this, rather than imposing the
10% administrative load (δ), informed by the literature, we find the administrative
load that would rationalize annuity demand.
Table 2: Calibration targets
Target

Value

Source

VSL

$10m

Kniesner and Viscusi (2019)

Mean wealth at age 65

$366,000

Survey of Consumer Finances

Proportion holding annuities at
age 65

5%

Pashchenko (2013)

Stock market participation rate
at age 65

50%

Alan (2006)

Notes: See the text for calculation and further details on source.

4.5

Results

Parameter estimates. Table 3 gives our baseline parameter estimates and
also shows, for comparison, the parameter estimates for the additive model. The
estimate for our risk-sensitive model of β, 0.966, is close to values typically estimated
in lifecycle models and additionally is very close to the value (0.97) assumed by
Pashchenko (2013) and Lockwood (2012), two papers which try to rationalize
low annuity-demand. De Nardi et al. (2010), on whose estimates we base our
parameterization of the bequest function, also use a value of 0.97. The specific
values we obtain for ul and k depend on normalization choices we made, and are
best understood when thinking of trade-off between consumption and life duration
(for ul ) or when looking at how agents compare different lotteries in life duration
(for k). Regarding ul , consider a setting with an agent whose consumption equals
the average yearly income. Such an agent endowed with the calibrated value of ul
would be willing to give up about 7% of her consumption during her last year of life
in exchange for one extra week of life. As for an interpretation of the magnitude of
k, which impacts risk aversion with respect to life duration, consider the following
situation. A 65 year-old agent, endowed with the set of preferences estimated in
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our baseline model is faced with a previously unanticipated option to undergo some
surgery, knowing that the surgery would increase her life expectancy, but would
involve taking a 5% risk of an immediate death. With our estimated value of k, the
agent would opt for surgery only if the increase in life expectancy (taking account
of the risk of dying in the ’operation’) exceeds 12 months.19 Had we set k = 0 (and
kept all other parameters the same), the agent would opt for the operation when
the increase in life expectancy is as short as 4 months.
The participation cost, at 170% of average annual income, is necessarily large to
match observed (non-)participation in risky assets when the equity premium is 4%,
(see, for example, Mehra and Prescott, 1985 and Kocherlakota, 1996). However,
note that this is paid only once.20 To place this quantity in perspective, for
those who pay the participation cost, it represents 2.4% of lifetime consumption
(discounted by the risk-free rate).
Table 3: Estimated parameters in baseline economy
Parameter

Risk-Sensitive

Additive Model

2.0†

2.0†

Risk aversion parameter, k

0.867

0.000†

Life-death utility gap, ul

3.570

12.020

Discount factor, β

0.966

0.953

Bequest motive strength, θ

56.55†

56.55†

Bequest luxury good, x

8.50†

8.50†

Annuity administrative load, δ

10%†

23%

170% of ȳ

175% of ȳ

Preferences
Inverse of IES, σ

Asset Markets
Participation cost, F

Notes: One unit of consumption is equal to ȳ. Quantities indicated by a
than estimated.
19

† are imposed rather

To calculate this, we find the scalar α that, when multiplied by all survival probabilities for
ages after 65, exactly compensates agents, in expectation, for the loss in utility associated with
the additional 5% chance of dying at the age of 65. We can then use this quantity to calculate
new life expectancies taking into account both the risk of dying in the operation and the greater
survival in each period if she survives.
20
In Section F, we study participation costs paid every time the agent invests in stock, instead
of once per life. In that calibration, the costs fall to 14% of average income.
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Estimated profiles. Figure 1 shows profiles of mean consumption, wealth, participation in stock market and VSL over the lifecycle for a simulated sample of
individuals. Results are reported for three specifications. The first two correspond
to the calibrated versions of the risk-sensitive (referred to as RS) and additive
(referred to as “calibrated-additive”) models, whose parameters are shown in Table
3. Both models, by construction, match the quantitative targets which are marked
on the graphs and predict that the proportion of individuals holding annuities
is 5%. The third specification, labeled as “uncalibrated-additive” corresponds to
the model obtained while keeping all parameters of the risk-sensitive case fixed,
but setting k = 0 to recover an additive specification. We show these results to
facilitate comparative statics with respect to the risk aversion parameter k.
Figure 1: Lifecycle profiles for the baseline calibration
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Comparative risk aversion. The RS agent is more risk averse than the “uncalibrated-additive” agent, but is identical in all other aspects. Comparing the predictions of the RS model with those of the “uncalibrated-additive” model therefore
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reflects the theoretical predictions of Section 3. We note however, that the framework here is a richer one than that outlined in Section 3 – in particular with the
addition of income and asset return uncertainty. These additions are likely to have
important effects: income uncertainty generates a precautionary savings effect that
is amplified with risk aversion.21 The negative relationship between risk aversion
and savings derived in Section 3 will thus be complemented by a precautionary
effect that would imply an opposed relation. Uncertainty in asset returns may also
contribute to a positive or negative relationship between risk aversion and savings,
depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and lifecycle income
profile. The overall impact of risk aversion is therefore theoretically ambiguous,
with its sign depending on the magnitude of the different risks at play. Figure
1 shows, however, that the RS agent saves less than the “uncalibrated-additive”
agent. Moreover the RS agent is less likely to purchase annuities (the annuity
participation rate is 5% for RS agents compared to 33% for additive agents). These
are in line with the predictions shown in Proposition 1.
From a quantitative standpoint, this means that the effects of income and
financial risks that we added in this quantitative investigation turn out to be too
small to offset the effect of mortality risk highlighted in our theory section. The
effect of the mortality risk tends therefore to dominate those of other risks. We
can interpret this as an indication that mortality risks loom larger for individuals
in their decision making than do the other risks they face.22
Figure 1 shows also that RS agents have a higher VSL at all ages and are
less likely to invest in stocks than the “uncalibrated-additive” agent. This simply
reflects that risk aversion increases the willingness to reduce exposure to mortality
and financial risks.
Overall, our results regarding the impact of risk aversion highlight that the
more risk averse the individual, the more she dislikes taking risks of any kind,
whether they are related to mortality, income or financial matters. It is worth
21

See Bommier and LeGrand (2019), who show, using risk-sensitive preferences in an infinite
horizon setting that there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and precautionary
savings.
22
This fact is also reflected in the very high willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction
revealed by empirical studies, which we used to calibrate our model.
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noting, however, that our findings strongly contrast with those of well-known
studies in the HF literature, such as Gomes and Michaelides (2005, 2008), who
find a positive relationship between risk aversion and stock market participation,
and Inkmann et al. (2011), who find that risk aversion increases the demand for
annuities. Explanations for these differences are provided in Section 5.
Comparison of the calibrated models. Let us now compare the predictions
of RS and “calibrated-additive” specifications. By construction, both specifications
predict the same accumulated wealth, stock market participation and annuity
market participation at age 65, and the same value of life at age 45. The lifecycle
profiles for consumption, wealth and stock market participation are therefore
similar, though with a divergence in the VSL over the second half of the lifecycle.23
A fundamental difference between the specifications is in how they confront
the ‘annuity puzzle’, that is, how they rationalize realistically low annuity demand.
Low annuity demand is rationalized for the additive agent with a counterfactually
high administrative load (23% compared to 10% for the RS agent) and a relatively
low discount factor (0.953 compared to 0.966 in the RS case). The RS agent, on
the other hand, is concerned that purchasing annuities may incur a loss in case
of an early death. Although she values the benefits of holding annuities to insure
against the consumption needs in the case of a long life, she also wants to have
significant investments in bonds or in stocks so that the early death adverse event
is mitigated by the transmission of a bequest to her heirs. A low level of annuity
demand can be rationalized, even if annuities are priced at close to actuarially fair
levels.

4.6

Does the precise VSL value matter?

In Appendix F, we provide an extended sensitivity analysis where we investigate the
robustness of the results to the structure of the participation cost, the calibration
age for the wealth and the target VSL. Here, we provide a brief discussion of the
23

Increasing risk aversion leads to a greater willingness to pay to avoid dramatic outcomes,
such as death at young age, as compared to adverse but less dramatic outcomes, such at death at
old age. Increasing risk aversion therefore tends to amplify the relationship between age and VSL.
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last of these – the impact of the VSL estimate, which is the main innovation of
this paper. We know from our theoretical section that the choice of a plausible
(and hence positive) value of the VSL is key to get the impact of risk aversion right.
A natural question, given that the empirical literature on VSL does not contain
a consensus estimate of its value, is how much our results would be impacted by
choosing a VSL target in the upper or lower range of empirical estimates.
The value that we choose, $10m, is approximately the level currently used by
US policy-makers. To assess whether this particular choice is instrumental in the
results, we estimate the parameters using the same calibration strategy and the
same calibration targets as in Section 4.4, except that we consider two alternative
targets for the VSL, $7.5m and $12.5m.
The calibrated parameters for the two VSL targets, as well as the plots of
the related lifecycle profiles for consumption, wealth, VSL, and stock market
participation can be found in Appendix F.1. These graphs show clearly that
changing the VSL target has very little impact on individual decisions (consumption,
wealth, asset market participation, and annuity purchase). The only significant
difference between calibrations is on the VSL lifetime profiles.
The reason that the precise VSL plays little role in agents’ choices when the VSL
is large is that the RS model admits a well-defined limit when the VSL becomes
infinite. To show this, we take the recursive equation (24) that defines the utility
Vt , representing risk-sensitive preferences, and consider the limit where ul tends
to infinity while maintaining the product kul equal to a constant, denoted by κ
in the following. This involves taking the limit where VSL goes to infinity while
maintaining risk aversion with respect to the life duration constant. It can easily
be shown through a first-order Taylor expansion that the risk-sensitive utility, Vt ,
can be approximated by Vt ' k1 Yt + Xt , where Xt and Yt are recursively defined by:
c1−σ
−1
Xt = (1 − β) t
(28)
1−σ


β
Yt+1
π
E
[X
]
+
(1
−
π
)e
E
[(1
−
β)v(x
)]
,
+
t
t
t+1
t
t
t+1
πt + (1 − πt )eYt+1


h

i



Yt = (1 − β)κ − β log πt Et e−Yt+1 + (1 − πt ) .

(29)

Under exogenous mortality, Yt is exogenous, and maximizing Vt is thus equivalent
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to maximizing Xt . For a large VSL, the RS model therefore converges to the
model represented by Xt . Notice that the recursive equation that defines Xt has an
additive structure, similar to the usual additive specification. However, it embeds
an (exogenous) age-dependent discount factor

β
πt +(1−πt )eYt+1

that reflects the impact

of mortality and risk aversion on impatience.24
Since the results we obtain depend very little on the VSL calibration target,
we deduce that our calibrated model is in fact relatively close to the infinite VSL
limit. In particular, as long as the VSL remains large, the uncertainty regarding the
precise value of the VSL is of limited concern. It also means that, to a first-order
approximation, the quantitative model we use could be replaced by a standard
additive model with an age-dependent discount factor. This may be helpful for
further applications.

5

Relation to previous studies in the HF literature

Most papers in the HF literature rely on the additive specification, which lacks
the flexibility to fully study the role of risk aversion in decision-making over the
lifecycle. In such papers, the expression “risk aversion” is most often used to refer to
a parameter (σ in our paper) that governs both intertemporal substitutability and
risk preferences. It is, however, well understood that models that assume different
IES are not comparable in terms of risk aversion (see Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974,
for instance). The findings of those papers cannot therefore be compared to ours.
The relevant comparison is with the subset of papers, such as Gomes and
Michaelides (2005, 2008), Inkmann et al. (2011) and many others, which, like
us, use recursive preferences to study the role of risk aversion in isolation. A
key difference is that our model was designed to fit empirical estimates of the
VSL, without imposing preference homotheticity, while the other papers typically
use EZW preferences to obtain homothetic (and tractable) specifications without
24

While the model obtained when maximizing Xt features age-dependent time discounting, it
is time consistent. Preferences are not stationary (they depend on age, reflecting the relationship
between age and mortality), but they do not exhibit preference reversals.
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paying attention to the implications for the VSL.
Formally, for EZW preferences in the presence of bequests, the recursion (8)
defining the utility conditional on being alive becomes:


Vt = (1 −

β)c1−σ
t

+β



h

1−γ
Et πt Vt+1

+ (1 −

πt )θx1−γ
t+1

1
i 1−σ  1−σ
1−γ

(30)

,

where, as in (26), θ determines the intensity of the bequest motive.25 There is
typically no discussion of the value of mortality risk reduction in HF papers, as
they assume that mortality is exogenous. Equation (30) nevertheless implicitly
assumes a specific sign for the value of mortality risk reduction. Indeed:
1−γ
1−γ 
i γ−σ
h
Et [Vt+1
] − θEt [xt+1
]
∂Vt
1−γ
1−γ
1−γ
Vtσ ,
=β
+ (1 − πt )θxt+1
Et πt Vt+1
∂πt
1−γ

which can be positive or negative. If γ > 1, as is assumed in the papers referenced
above, a positive value of mortality risk reduction is obtained only if θ >

1−γ
Et [Vt+1
]

Et [x1−γ
t+1 ]

.

The results of Gomes and Michaelides (2005, 2008) and those of Inkmann et al.
(2011) indicate that this condition does not hold (at least not always) in their
simulations.26 In particular, a negative value of mortality risk reduction is systematically obtained when there is no bequest motive (θ = 0), a case considered in
several instances in those papers. With a negative value of mortality risk reduction,
the rate of time discounting is underestimated, and the underestimation is amplified
by risk aversion. Risk aversion is then found to amplify savings. The difference
in saving behaviors eventually generates differences in the propensity to pay the
stock market participation cost. This explains why Gomes and Michaelides (2005,
2008) find that more risk averse agents tend to participate more frequently in the
stock market. Moreover, with a negative value of mortality risk reduction, the
risk of losing annuitized wealth in case of an early death is not seen as a major
concern, as short lives are seen as good outcomes. This impacts the willingness to
25

A formal derivation of equation (30) can be found in the appendix of Gomes et al. (2009), for
example.
26
One should notice, moreover, that if specification (30) were to be used with γ > 1 and a
parameter θ large enough to generate positive values of mortality risk reduction, we would obtain
a framework where the intensity of the bequest motive would increase the willingness to pay for
∂ 2 Vt
mortality risk reduction: ∂π
> 0. However, this would go against intuition, since deriving
t ∂θ
utility from bequest reduces the welfare gap between life and death. In well-behaved models,
such as the RS or additive models, altruism has a negative impact on the value of mortality risk
reduction (see equations (36) and (37) for instance) – as one would expect.
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purchase annuities, which is found to increase with risk aversion (Inkmann et al.,
2011). Overall, with a negative VSL, risk aversion is found to increase savings,
stock market participation and annuity purchases, providing conclusions which
are opposite to ours. This is fully in line with the theoretical results developed
in Section 3, where we discussed the case of a counterfactual negative value of
mortality risk reduction.

6

Conclusion

Inspired by Samuelson (1937), economic contributions on intertemporal choice
have most often relied on models that assume time-additive preferences. While
time-additive preferences offered an elegant framework to formalize insightful
theories, such as Modigliani’s lifecycle consumption theory, they have some serious
limitations. One of the caveats associated with the time-additive model is its
lack of flexibility, in particular, the fact that its use means that risk aversion and
intertemporal substitutability cannot be disentangled. This was underlined both by
theoreticians (Epstein and Zin, 1989) and experimentalists (Andersen et al., 2008).
Theoretical contributions, such as those of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990),
have addressed this limitation by introducing a recursive framework that is both
tractable and flexible. These EZW preferences have met with a remarkable success.
While EZW preferences were initially developed to deal with infinitely-lived agents,
their adaptation to finite and random horizon settings encountered some serious
difficulties. Some papers in the VoL literature introduced specifications that are
ill-defined and yield counterfactual implications. Others, in the HF literature,
implicitly assumed that all agents have a preference for death over survival. Papers
in both literatures imported the non-monotonicity features that are inherent to
EZW preferences. The consequences of these features were discussed in Section 2.
In the current paper, we propose a framework that can model lifecycle behaviors with recursive preferences that are well-defined, flexible, monotone and can
simultaneously match realistic (positive) values for mortality risk reduction and
plausible lifecycle profiles for consumption and wealth. We outline how using such
a specification facilitates new and intuitive insights on the role of risk aversion,
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affording a potential explanation for several documented – though imperfectly
understood – household behaviors, such as the low demand for annuities. We
believe that in an era of on-going demographic changes, the economics of aging will
remain a key research area, with new forms of risks becoming increasing sources
of concern (not least the increased likelihood of expensive long-term care at the
oldest ages). While time-additive preferences have facilitated valuable insights, the
field would benefit from a framework that allows a full investigation of the role of
risk aversion. The approach put forward in this paper could serve as a foundation
of such a framework for the HF or the VoL literature.
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Appendix
A

Accounting for the taste for Russian-roulette
lotteries

A point regularly made against the additive model is that in the usual case where
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one, there necessarily exists a
consumption level such that the agent prefers being dead to being alive with that
level of consumption. Formally, if one assumes
1
),
σ

−cu(c)0
u00 (c)

to be constant (say equal to

1−σ

one must have u(c) = u0 + K c1−σ for some constant K, which has to be positive

for utility to be increasing with consumption. Then, if σ > 1, one necessarily has
u(c) < 0 for small c, meaning that life becomes worse than death. Agents provided
with a wealth endowment that would only allow them to sustain such “worse than
death” consumption levels, would prefer to enter Russian-roulette games, whose
outcome is either “death” or a “better than death” consumption level.
But why do we assume that

−cu(c)0
u00 (c)

is constant over the whole set R+ ? Empirical

studies typically consider a setting in which consumption lies on a compact interval
[cmin , cmax ], with cmin > 0. Thus, if we know something about the IES, it is at most
that it is constant on an interval [cmin , cmax ]. There is no difficulty in constructing
a well-behaved utility function such that

−cu(c)0
u00 (c)

is constant over [cmin , cmax ] and

u(c) > 0 over R+ . Consider for example σ > 1, σ̃ < 1, a constant ul >

c1−σ
min
1−σ̃

−

c1−σ
min −1
1−σ

and the utility given by:

u(c) =




u


ũ

where ũl = ul +

c1−σ
min −1
1−σ

+

l
l

+

c1−σ −1
1−σ

for all c ≥ cmin ,

+

c1−σ̃ −1
cσ̃−σ
min 1−σ̃

for all c ≤ cmin ,

1−σ
cσ̃−σ
min −cmin
.
1−σ̃

(31)

The utility function is continuous and positive

on R+ (including in 0). Moreover, we have:



u0 (c)

= c−σ



u0 (c)

= c−σ
min

for all c ≥ cmin ,


c

−σ̃

cmin

for all c ≤ cmin ,

implying that the marginal utility function is also continuous, positive and decreas37

ing (which implies in turn that u is concave). Such a utility function is therefore
“well-behaved” (increasing, concave and continuously differentiable). It would be
consistent with the empirical evidence that the IES is constant and equal to

1
σ

(thus below 1) when consumption lies in [cmin , cmax ], as well as with the evidence
that nobody likes to play the Russian-roulette-style lotteries.
Finally, note that given that allowing for a non-constant elasticity of substitution
as suggested above makes it possible to avoid the existence of consumption levels
for which utility becomes negative, and therefore the taste for Russian-roulette
lotteries, we consider it to be a theoretical curiosity with limited implications for
applied work. That is due to the fact that, if one restricts attention to settings in
which consumption always remain above cmin , what is assumed regarding the IES
below cmin is mostly irrelevant. This explains why the simulations developed in
the paper simply assume an instantaneous utility of the form ul +

c1−σ −1
1−σ

without

introducing the more complex form shown in (31).

B

Proofs

B.1

Proof of Proposition 1


Denote θ̃ =

θ
, u
β 1−β

1−σ

Rf (b+ πa )
0

= ul +

1−σ

,

v
1−β

=θ

(Rf b)

1−σ

and define ũ by:

1−σ

e−kũ = πe−ku + (1 − π0 )e−kv .

(32)

The solution of the optimization problem fulfills:
1

k

1

1 − θ̃ σ e σ (u−v)

k

w0
θ̃ σ e σ (u−v)
a = w0
,
and
b
=
.
1
1
(βRf )− σ k (u−ũ)
(βRf )− σ k (u−ũ)
π
0
σ
σ
1 + π0 e
1 + π0 e

(33)

Equations in (33) imply:
b+

w0
a
=
π0
π0 1 +

1
1
(βRf )− σ

π0

.

k

e σ (u−ũ)

Now consider the impact of an increase in k. From (32) we have ek(u−ũ) =
π0 + (1 − π0 )ek(u−v) , such that

∂
∂k

(k(u − v)) and

∂
∂k

(k(u − ũ)) have the same sign.

Similarly, ek(v−ũ) = π0 ek(v−u) + 1 − π0 , implying that
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∂
∂k

(k(ũ − v)) also has the

same sign as

∂
∂k

(k(u − v)).

Assume now that u − v > 0 and k ≥ 0. Imagine that k(u − v) decreases when
k increases. We would have b +

a
π0

(thus u) increasing, and b (thus v) decreasing.

∂
Thus (u − v) would increase, yielding a contradiction, since ∂k
(k(u − v)) = (u −
∂
v) + k ∂k
(u − v) with both terms that would be positive. Thus k(u − v) increases

with k, implying that a decreases with k, b increases, b +

a
π0

and b + a decreases.

Assume now that u − v < 0 and k ≥ 0. Imagine that k(u − v) increases
when k increases. We would have b +

a
π0

(thus u) decreasing, and b (thus v)

∂
increasing. Thus u−v would decrease, yielding a contradiction, since ∂k
(k(u − v)) =
∂
(u−v)+k ∂k
(u − v) with both terms that would be negative. Thus k(u−v) decreases

with k, which implies that a increases with k, b decreases, b + πa0 and b + a increase.

B.2

Proof of the example about “investment in precaution”

In each state i = h, s, the best response e∗i maximizes:
e∗i = arg max



e∈[0,w0 ]

1−σ

(1 − β)(w0 − e)1−σ + (1 − β)βπi (e) 1−γ c1−σ
1



1
1−σ

,

which implies the following first-order condition:
(w0 − e∗i )−σ =

γ−σ
β
πi0 (e∗i )πi (e∗i ) 1−γ c11−σ .
1−γ

When the value of mortality risk reduction is negative, or equivalently when γ > 1,
a necessary condition for an interior solution to exist is πi0 (e) < 0: in other words,
extra precaution should diminish the survival probability. If the opposite holds,
i.e., if πi0 (e) > 0, the optimal choice is always zero precaution. Let us assume that
conditions hold for an interior solution to exist in each state.
We consider a case in which best responses e∗h and e∗s are identical in both states.
This holds if:
γ−σ

γ−σ

πh0 (e∗h )πh (e∗h ) 1−γ = πs0 (e∗s )πs (e∗s ) 1−γ .

(34)

In the absence of perfect foresight, the agent solves the following program:


1−σ

max (1 − β)(w0 − e)1−σ + β(1 − β) (ph πh (e) + ps πs (e)) 1−γ c1−σ
1
e≥0
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1
1−σ

.

If it exists, the interior optimal effort level e∗ solves:
(w0 − e∗ )−σ =

γ−σ
β
.
(ph πh0 (e∗ ) + ps πs0 (e∗ )) (ph π(e∗ ) + ps πs (e∗ )) 1−γ c1−σ
1
1−γ

For the optimum to be the same as the (identical) perfect-foresight best-responses
σ−γ

σ−γ

we should have, using (34), E[π 1−σ ]E[π]− 1−σ = 1, where E[·] is the expectation
with respect to ph and ps . When ph ∈ (0, 1), Jensen’s Inequality implies that
the previous inequality cannot hold (unless γ = σ, which corresponds to the risksensitive or the additive model). In conclusion, since e∗ 6= e∗h = e∗s , the agent takes
a dominated action as choosing e∗h or e∗s would provide a higher welfare in states h
and s.

B.3

Deriving VSL expressions

We rewrite the problem using wealth and portfolio shares. Let wt = At−1 +
Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 be the beginning-of-period wealth at date t. We also denote by
ωt = qt at + bt + st the total saving choice, by αtb =
αts =

st
ωt

bt
ωt

the share in bonds and by

the share in stocks. The program of the alive agent can be rewritten as:

Vt (wt , At−1 , ηt−1 , ζt−1 ) =

max

ct ≥0,ωt ≥0,(αbt ,αst )∈[0,1]2

(1 − β)u(ct )


h
i
h
i
β
− log πt Et e−kVt+1 (wt+1 ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) + (1 − πt )Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ,
k

subject to the following constraints:
yt + wt = ct + ωt + 1ηt =1 1ηt−1 =0 F,
!

wt = At−1 + ωt

!

!

1
1
1
s
+ Rf −
αtb + Rt+1
−
αts ,
qt
qt
qt





s
xt = ωt Rf αtb + Rt+1
αts .

The envelope theorem yields


∂Vt
∂wt

=

∂Vt
∂ct

= (1 − β)u0 (ct ). Furthermore:

h

i

h

Et e−kVt+1 (wt ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) − Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 )

i

∂Vt
β
=−
∂πt
k πt Et [e−kVt+1 (wt+1 ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) ] + (1 − πt )Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]
h

+β



πt Et (1 − β)u0 (ct+1 )ωt 1 − αtb − αts
πt Et [e−kVt+1 (wt+1 ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) ] + (1 −
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∂(1/qt ) −kVt+1 (wt ,At ,ηt ,ζt )
e
∂πt
πt )Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]

(35)
i

.

∂(1/qt )
∂πt

We have
∂(1/qt )
∂πt

∂qt
= − q12 ∂π
, with
t
t

∂qt
∂πt

= (1 + δ) ∂π∂ t

P∞

Qt+τ −1
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s=t
τ
f
R

τ =1

( )

qt
.
πt

=

This gives

= − πt1qt . We deduce from (35):


h

i

h

Et e−kVt+1 (wt ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) − Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 )

i

∂Vt
β
=−
∂πt
k πt πt Et [e−kVt+1 (wt ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) ] + (1 − πt )Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]
h

−
With

ωt
qt







β(1 − β)Et u0 (ct+1 ) ωqtt 1 − αtb − αts e−kVt+1 (wt ,At ,ηt ,ζt )
πt Et [e−kVt+1 (wt ,At ,ηt ,ζt ) ] + (1 − πt )Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]

i

.



1 − αtb − αts = at , we finally obtain:
Et [e−kVt+1 (bt ,At ,st ,ηt ,ζt ) ]−Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]
−
k



V SLt =



1
β
−σ
1 − β ct πt Et [e−kVt+1 (bt ,At ,st ,ηt ,ζt ) ] + (1 − πt )Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]
Et

− βat




ct+1 −σ
ct

e

−kVt+1 (bt ,At ,st ,ηt ,ζt )

(36)



πt Et [e−kVt+1 (bt ,At ,st ,ηt ,ζt ) ] + (1 − πt )Et [e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) ]

,

and in the additive case, by continuity for k → 0:

β
1  add
V
(b
,
A
,
s
,
η
,
ζ
)
−
k(1
−
β)v(x
)
t
t
t
t
t
t+1
t+1
1 − β c−σ
#
"t
u0 (ct+1 )
.
− βat Et
u0 (ct )

V SLadd
=
t

(37)

Note that, in both the RS and additive cases, as well as in real life, the VSL is
impacted by uncertainty regarding future consumption. Such aspects are usually
ignored in the VSL literature, but can be taken into account with our approach.
This makes the calibration more realistic, even though some other sources of
uncertainty (as those related to health) which could also be taken into account are
not included.

C

Calibration of bequest parameters

To calibrate bequest parameters, we compute the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) and the maximal no bequest wealth for an agent in the last period before
certain death. We further assume that she can only invest in a riskless bond. Up
to a normalization by (1 − β)−1 , her program can be expressed as follows:
max u(W − b) + βv(Rf b),
s∈R
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where b is the riskless saving. There are two cases for first-order conditions.
1. No bequest is left if and only if u0 (W ) ≥ βRf v 0 (0).
2. A positive bequest is left otherwise, and is determined by:
u0 (W − b) = βRf v 0 (Rf b).

(38)

Equation (38) implies that, if the maximal wealth that yields no bequest is
denoted as W0 , it follows that u0 (W0 ) = βRf v 0 (0).
Using the expressions (25) and (26) for instantaneous utility functions, the previous
equation becomes:


W0 = κx, with κ = βRf θ

− 1

σ

.

(39)

Now, let us assume that W ≥ W0 . The FOC (38) implies the following expression
for the optimal bequest:
b=
as well the following MPC

1
∂c
W −b ∂W

W − κx
,
1 + κRf


= Rf R1f b 1 −

(40)
∂c
∂W



. Using (40), we finally get:


− 1
Rf κ
∂c
σ
f
=
,
with:
κ
=
βR
θ
.
∂W
1 + Rf κ

D

(41)

Details on the computational implementation

There is no analytical solution to the agents’ problem outlined in Section 4. We solve
the model and obtain decision rules numerically and then use those decision rules
to simulate the agents’ behavior. The next two subsections describe, respectively,
the solution of the model and the simulation of decision rules.

D.1

Model solution

While alive, the agent maximizes her intertemporal utility by choosing a feasible
allocation (ct , bt , at , st , ηt )t≥0 in the set A. The utility Vt of the alive agent at age
t depends on five state variables: the beginning-of-period holdings in bonds bt−1 ,
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annuities At−1 and stocks st−1 ; the stochastic component of labor income, ζt−1 ; and
the stock market participation status, ηt−1 ∈ {0, 1}. The last of these is discrete,
while the first four are continuous. Given that annuity purchase may only occur
in period TR − 1, we have At = 0 for all t < TR and At = aTR −1 for t ≥ TR . Since
there exists a maximal age for the agent, TM , we solve the model by iterating
on the value function, starting from the last period of life. Utility maximization
involves solving:
VTM (bTm −1 , ATm −1 , sTm −1 , ηTm −1 , ζTm −1 ) =
max

(42)
h

(cTM ,bTM ,aTM ,sTM ,wTM ,ηTM )∈A

i

(1 − β)u(cTm ) + Et e−k(1−β)v(xTm +1 ) ,

subject to the constraints, which we don’t restate here, outlined in Section 4.1.
Due to the presence of stocks in bequest, the continuation utility in case of death is
uncertain. Both the instantaneous utility function for period Tm (u(xTm )) and the
utility obtained when dying and bequeathing xTM +1 (v(xTM +1 )) are known and the
model is solved for a discrete set of points on a grid. This gives us knowledge of
VTm at a subset of the points in the state space and allows us to approximate VTm
as V̂Tm at all points. With this approximation in hand we solve an approximation
to problem (42) for period TM − 1 and then, iteratively, for all preceding periods t:
Vt (bt−1 , At−1 , st−1 , ηt−1 , ζt−1 ) =

max

(ct ,bt ,at ,st ,wt ,ηt )∈A

(1 − β)u(ct )

(43)


h
i
h
i
β
− log πt Et e−kV̂t+1 (bt ,At ,st ,ηt ,ζt ) + (1 − πt )Et e−k(1−β)v(xt+1 ) .
k

Note that the only difference between the maximand in (43) and that in our
household’s problem is that the continuation value function is an approximate value
function. We will now, briefly, discuss four features of the numerical procedure:
i) the discretization of the continuous variables, ii) the integration of the value
function, iii) the approximation method for evaluating the value function at points
outside the discretized state space and iv) how the optimization is carried out.
Discretization of the continuous variables. We define a variable, total liquid
wealth, which is the sum of bond and stock holdings at the start of a period. We
define a grid of 54 points from $0 to $10m such that the gaps between successive
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grid points are smaller at lower levels of wealth, where the curvature of the value
function will be greater. We define a grid of 36 points for annuity income from
$0 to $800,000 such that the gaps between successive grid points are smaller at
lower levels of income. Earnings are placed on a grid of 7 points each year using
the procedure introduced by Tauchen (1986).
Integration. There are three risks facing households: mortality, earnings and
financial risks. The risks are independent. Realizations for the first of these are
naturally discrete and integration involves a simple weighted average. For the latter
two, we define a discrete set of possible realizations and integrate over outcomes
using the Tauchen (1986) procedure.
Approximation. To evaluate the value function at points other than those in
the discrete sub-set of points, we use linear interpolation in multiple dimensions.
Optimization. Every period households make up to four choices. They decide
on how much to consume, how much to save in each of bonds and the risky asset,
whether to pay the participation charge (if they have not previously done so) and
how much of an annuity income stream to purchase (in the period before retirement).
Our problem is not globally concave, so our optimization of the household’s decision
problem cannot fully rely on local approaches. We therefore start by discretizing
the choice variables. We define three grids on the unit interval, Sat , Ss , Sc , which
will represent shares of available resources dedicated to purchases of annuities,
portfolio shares in stocks and consumption respectively. All grids have equally
spaced nodes from 0 to 1 (except that in periods other than period TR−1 , the grid
for annuities has only one element – 0 – as no annuity purchase is possible in those
periods). We evaluate the household’s objective function at each combination of
(sta,i )i=1,...,I t in Sat , (ss,j )j=1,...,J in Ss , and (sc,k )k=1,...,K in Sc,k . In particular, defining
the total available resources as Rt = yt + wt (the sum of income and wealth) in
time t, we set the annuity choice to sta,i Rt , the level of saving in the risky asset
set to ss,j (1 − sta,i )Rt , the level of consumption as sc,k (1 − ss,j )(1 − sta,i )Rt and the
savings in the bond as (1 − sc,k )(1 − ss,j )(1 − sta,i )Rt . We find the combination
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of the points that yields the maximum value to the household. This is our
candidate optimal decision. We then do a further local search for the split between
consumption and the bond using golden section search. Formally, taking the
candidate maximum as indexed by sta,i∗ in Sat , ss,j ∗ in Ss , sc,k∗ in Sc,k , we look for
the utility-maximizing split between consumption and the bond in the interval for
consumption of [sc,max{1,k∗ −1} (1−ss,j ∗ )(1−sta,i∗ )R, sc,min{K,k∗ +1} (1−ss,j ∗ )(1−sta,i∗ )R].
For points in the state space where individuals have not already paid the
participation charge we implement this procedure twice, once assuming they pay
the charge, once assuming they do not. The maximum of these indicates the
decision rule.
This procedure yields decision rules as a function of the vector of state variables
X t : ĉ(X t )t , b̂(X t )t , ŝ(X t )t , â(X t )t , η̂(X t )t .

D.2

Simulation of Profiles

Once decision rules ĉ(X t )t , b̂(X t )t , ŝ(X t )t , â(X t )t , η̂(X t )t are obtained, we simulate
a data set for 3,000 individuals. We do this as follows:
1. Initial values for wealth are set to 0.
2. Earnings draws for the first period of economic life are drawn randomly for
each individual. Using these values of the state variables and the decision
rules we can obtain optimal behavior in the first period.
3. We draw a equity price shock to apply to any equity holdings held at the end
of the period.
4. Optimal behavior, the rate of return and the inter-temporal budget constraint
yield the state variables for period 2.
5. We repeat steps (2) to (4) to obtain optimal behavior and subsequent state
variables for each age up to 100. In most time periods, individuals will
have realizations of the continuous state variables that are off this grid. Our
approach here is to solve the individual’s problem for decision rules as we do
in the solution stage.
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E

Lifecycle productivity

The shape of the deterministic age-productivity profile is taken from Harenberg
and Ludwig (2019), who compute it from PSID data using the method in Huggett
et al. (2011) US$.27 Figure 2 displays our average earnings profile.
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Figure 2: Average earnings over the lifecycle

20

F

25

30

35

40

Age

45

50

55

60

65

Sensitivity analysis

F.1

High and low targets for the VSL

In this section we discuss the sensitivity of our results with respect to the VSL
target. We calibrate the model using the same targets as in the baseline calibration
(see Section 4.4), except that we consider two different targets for the VSL: a high
VSL target of 12.5 million USD (+25% compared to the baseline target) and a low
VSL target of 7.5 million (−25% compared to the baseline target). Calibration
values can be found in Table 4. We report the parameter values for the additive
and the RS models, for the two VSL targets.
For the additive model, Table 4 shows, as expected, that the calibration is not
sensitive to the VSL target, except for the life-death utility gap ul . This results
27

Note that we multiply labor income with ȳ, thereby making sure that average labor income
in 2016 is matched, cf. equation 14.
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Table 4: Parameter calibration with low and high VSL targets
Parameter

Low VSL

High VSL

RS

Additive

RS

Additive

Risk aversion parameter, k

1.49

0.00†

0.60

0.00†

Life-death utility gap, ul

2.30

9.03

4.81

15.01

Discount factor, β

0.965

0.953

0.966

0.953

†

†

†

Preferences

Bequest motive strength, θ

56.55

56.55

56.55

56.55†

Bequest luxury good, x

8.50†

8.50†

8.50†

8.50†

Annuity admin. load, δ

10%†

23%

10%†

23%

161% of ȳ

175% of ȳ

Asset markets
Participation cost, F

167% of ȳ 175% of ȳ
Notes: One unit of consumption is equal to ȳ. Quantities indicated by a † are imposed rather
than estimated.

from the invariance of the additive model up to a positive affine transformation.
Therefore, individual choices with either a low or a high VSL target remain
unchanged from those in the baseline model.
For the RS model, the calibration does depend on the VSL target and Table
4 shows that parameter values other than ul differ when the calibration target
changes. However, despite these different parameter values, individual lifetime
profiles are almost indistinguishable across calibrations, as can be seen in Figure
3. These three profiles in each graph correspond to the RS model for the three
VSL targets (the baseline, the low and the high values). As explained in the main
text, except for the VSL lifecycle profiles that differ by construction, the lifecycle
profiles for the consumption, wealth and stock market participation are basically
the same for the three calibrations. As long as the VSL target is sufficiently high,
the exact VSL value has little impact on individual choices, since the RS model
can be approximated by a limit model, which is additive with an age-dependent
discount factor (see its formal definition in equations (28) and (29)).
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Figure 3: Lifecycle profiles for different VSL targets
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F.2

20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age

Changing the age for the wealth target from age 65 to
age 45

In our baseline calibration, age 65 plays a key role: our calibration targets for wealth,
the stock market participation, and the annuity holdings are matched at that age.
This choice is motivated by the fact that age 65 is the exogenous retirement age
in the model, and the annuity decision is only made once, in the period before
retirement. Here we show the sensitivity of our results to the calibration age for
the wealth target, which we change from age 65 to age 45. All other targets remain
unchanged (including VSL), and both the RS and the additive models are still
calibrated following the procedure described in Section 4.4.
The details of the calibration parameters for the two models can be found in
Table 5. The main differences in this specification’s calibration concern the participation cost, F , and the annuity administrative load, δ. First, the administrative
load, which remains 10% by construction for the RS model, is now required to be
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Table 5: Parameter calibration with age 65 for the wealth target
Parameter

Risk-Sensitive

Additive Model

Risk aversion parameter, k

1.90

0.00†

Life-death utility gap, ul

2.49

9.68

Discount factor, β

0.977

0.976

Bequest motive strength, θ

56.55†

56.55†

Bequest luxury good, x

8.50†

8.50†

Annuity administrative load, δ

10%†

54%

210% of ȳ

330% of ȳ

Preferences

Asset Markets
Participation cost, F

54% in the additive model in order to match annuity demand. This compares to a
level of 23% in the age 65 calibration (see Table 3). Second, while the stock market
participation cost slightly increases for the RS model to 210%, from 170% for the
age 65 calibration (Table 3, again), for the additive model, the participation cost
increase is much bigger, to 330% from 175% for the age 65 calibration.
In conclusion, targeting wealth at age 45 requires more substantial financial
market imperfections – a higher participation cost and a higher annuity load –
than in the baseline calibration when targeting wealth at age 65. This sensitivity
exercise reinforces our conclusions in Section 4.5 regarding the comparison between
RS and additive models.
Figure 4 reports the lifetime profiles for consumption, average wealth, VSL and
stock market participation for the baseline and for the case when age 45 is targeted.
Quantitative differences are modest.

F.3

Participation cost every period

We here assume that the stock market participation cost is paid in every period in
which the agent trades stocks. This follows Fagereng et al. (2017), among others.
The budget constraint (17) when alive becomes:
ct + bt + st + F 1st >0 = yt + Rf bt−1 + Rts st−1 .
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Figure 4: Lifecycle profiles for different targets regarding median wealth age
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The rest of the agent’s program remains unchanged. Note, however, that since
the stock market participation is decided in every period, the participation status,
denoted by η in the original program, is not needed as a state variable any more.
The new values for the calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 6. The main
difference compared to the baseline is the participation cost that now falls from
a one-off charge of 170% of annual income to 14.2% of average income y. Our
substantive conclusions are unaffected by this choice.
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Table 6: Parameter calibration with age 65 for the wealth target
Parameter

Risk-Sensitive

Additive Model

Risk aversion parameter, k

0.95

0.00†

Life-death utility gap, ul

3.50

12.273

Discount factor, β

0.967

0.953

Bequest motive strength, θ

56.55†

56.55†

Bequest luxury good, x

8.50†

8.50†

Annuity administrative load, δ

10%†

23%

14.2% of ȳ

14.4% of ȳ

Preferences

Asset Markets
Annual Participation cost, F
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